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Introduction
One oF the wonderful things which has happened in modern times, as well as many tragedies and evil events, is that “Buddhism” was 
discovered by the Western world. Not only was Buddhism discovered by 
the Western world, it was also transmitted to the Western world. Discovery, 
by Western scholars from the Frenchman Eugène Burnouf onwards, and 
transmission, by many Eastern scholars and advocates such as Nanjō 
Bun’yū 南条文雄 (1849–1927), Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 (1866–1945) 
and Suzuki Daisetsu1 鈴木大拙 (1870–1966) from Japan, or others from Sri 
Lanka and so on, belong together in a complex process of interaction. This 
event of combined discovery and transmission is comparable, in its cultural 
significance and subtlety, to the transmission of Buddhism from India to 
China so many centuries ago. Moreover, although this complex process 
began considerably before his time, there is no doubt that Suzuki played 
a leading role in it. The fortieth anniversary of his death was marked by a 
series of events in the context of which the present paper arose.2 There is 
1 Although Suzuki himself sometimes used the transliteration Daisetz, no doubt in an 
attempt to stop foreigners from over-pronouncing the last syllable, it does not correspond to 
formal guidelines and is not followed here.
2 It was the last of three public lectures arranged in late 2006 by Otani University, Kyoto, 
the first being given by Ueda Shizuteru 上田閑照 and the second by Norman Waddell. Though 
originally in Japanese, a shortened version was made available on the internet in English. 
These events accompanied an exhibition organized by the Otani University Library, in 
collaboration with the Matsugaoka Bunko (the leading Suzuki archive), with the title: “Daisetsu: 
Sono hito to gakumon” 大拙：その人と学問. There was an accompanying catalogue of exhibits, 
the English title being “Special Exhibition in Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of 
Daisetz Suzuki’s Death.”
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probably no other single writer whose works have had a greater influence 
on the European and North American reception of Buddhism in general 
and of Zen Buddhism in particular. He wrote much, and in an easy style. 
He carried out scholarly research into Buddhist texts and Buddhist thought, 
but at the same time he addressed his readers with an endless supply of 
anecdotes, quotations and teasing remarks. He had his own view of “the 
West” and of “the East,” and he had his own view of “Buddhism.”
In what follows, I will be considering how these three images of “the 
West,” “the East” and “Buddhism” influenced each other in Suzuki’s own 
mind, and to what extent these same images may be maintained today or 
are in need of correction. Recent discussions about the construction of such 
images of “the East” or “the West” have to be taken into account. Also, 
views of “Buddhism” today must take into account not only the fruit of 
much research of international quality carried out both within and outside 
Japan, but also the impact of images of Buddhism from outside Japan or 
other traditionally Buddhist countries.
As is well known, Suzuki’s first, albeit indirect encounter with the 
Western world was on the occasion of the World’s Parliament of Religions 
which took place in Chicago in 1893.3 As can be seen from the recorded 
proceedings of this conference, or as one might better say, this encounter, 
there was a substantial Japanese delegation of representatives who were all 
at pains to present the claims of Japanese culture, politics and religion to a 
wider audience. The hosts, on the other hand, mostly saw this encounter as 
an opportunity to celebrate what they regarded as the superiority of Western 
civilization and Christianity, sometimes differentiated and sometimes not. 
Other important voices from Asian countries were also heard, notably 
that of Swami Vivekānanda and others from India. Evidently the whole 
event was something of a shock for all sides, and it subsequently led to 
great efforts by representatives of both Hinduism and Buddhism to get 
themselves better understood in the Western world. 
Typical expressions of this great effort of self-representation in Japan 
may be found in the pages of early issues of The Eastern Buddhist, and 
perhaps more strikingly in another journal, The Young East. While the for-
mer concentrated on Buddhist studies, as the name implies, the latter also 
3 He did not actually attend this event, but was quite conscious of it, having been involved 
in preparatory discussions about it in Japan. In the follow-up period, Suzuki, the young 
interpreter, was sent to the United States by Shaku Sōen 釈宗演, who had been present in 
Chicago.
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included various contributions from India, e.g., by Rabindranath Tagore, 
who contributed to the first issue. Another difference between the two is 
that during the 1930s The Young East, having more modest academic pre-
tensions and containing articles on various topical matters, was gradually 
drawn into a more ideological direction. Its leading editor, the Buddhist 
scholar Takakusu Junjirō, also well known as one of the editors of the 
major modern Japanese edition of the Buddhist scriptures in Chinese, the 
Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大蔵経, developed very clear nationalist 
tendencies. Suzuki did not go so far. On the other hand he did not entirely 
escape the intellectual dangers of the nihonjinron 日本人論 syndrome, as it 
later came to be called. It is significant that his book Zen Buddhism and 
Its Influence on Japanese Culture, based on lectures given in America and 
England and published in English in 1938, also found favour in Germany 
under the title Zen und die Kultur Japans (1941) at the height of the 
Second World War in the European arena. This was a time when it was 
very acceptable in Germany to be astonished at the fascinating exoticism 
of Japanese culture in general and the connections between Zen Buddhism 
and martial culture in particular.4 In all of these matters the construction 
and interaction of images are of the greatest importance. It is notable that 
the idea of “the East” (tōyō 東洋) is included in the titles of both of the 
journals mentioned above, that is “East” over against “West.” Indeed there 
are a great many terms used often in the late nineteenth century and the first 
part of the twentieth century which include the element “East.” We see it in 
the name of Tōyō University (in Tokyo), which in its public presentations 
has always emphasized the contribution of Eastern thinkers to the history 
of ideas, and we find it again in such influential works as The Ideals of the 
East (1903) by Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三 (1863–1913, more commonly 
known as Okakura Tenshin 天心) or Ways of Thinking of Eastern People: 
India, China, Tibet, Japan (1960) by Nakamura Hajime 中村元 (1912–1999).
Suzuki was a most eager communicator in this context, while at the 
same time he was a serious student of the textual aspect of the Buddhist 
tradition. Although he began to write much earlier, his most productive 
period was in the 1920s and 1930s, and during this time he not only wrote 
several books on Zen Buddhism which have been reprinted and translated 
again and again, but also carried out textual studies making use of Sanskrit, 
4 The later American edition of this work, Zen and Japanese Culture (1959), contained 
substantial chapters on “the way of the sword” which according to the preface were added at 
that time.
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notably concerning the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra. His translation of this relatively 
early Mahayana Buddhist text is, to this day, the only one available in a 
Western language. His three-volume work, Essays in Zen Buddhism, began 
to appear in the late 1920s and his other works on Zen such as Introduction 
to Zen Buddhism, The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk, and Manual of 
Zen Buddhism were all published in the 1930s, that is, during the pre-war 
period. This meant that, after the end of the war, when a particularly strong 
interest in Zen Buddhism developed in America and almost immediately 
thereafter in Western Europe, Suzuki’s works were, so to speak, all on the 
table. German and other translations followed quickly. New writings also 
appeared. Some dealt again with Zen Buddhism, for example The Zen 
Doctrine of No-Mind (1949) which in its very title seemed to challenge the 
Western philosophical interest in “mind.” The concept of mushin 無心 (no-
mind) must have seemed at that time to represent a denial of all serious 
philosophy in the West.  At the same time, it is interesting that other works 
specifically took up the interaction with Western religious and secular 
thinking, notably Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist (1957) and Zen 
Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (1960), which also contained contributions 
by Erich Fromm and Richard DeMartino.5
Orientalism, Occidentalism and “Westernism”
In the four decades since Suzuki died in 1966, we have seen, as everybody 
knows, the “orientalism” debate, and we hear frequently about how “West-
erners” have created their own images of various cultures and above all 
religions. We have been told not only about the Western “discovery” 
of Buddhism, but also about the Western “invention” of “Hinduism,” 
“Daoism,” “Yoga,” and so on.6 It is often overlooked that “Westerners” are 
a very mixed class of beings! Probably they have been invented themselves.
Less frequently debated, but equally significant as a cultural process, is 
the reverse equivalent which has been called “occidentalism.” According 
5 This work was published in 1963 in German translation as Zen-Buddhismus und 
Psychoanalyse. An extensive bibliography of Suzuki’s works may be found in Das 
Menschenbild bei Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: Gedanken zur Anthropologie des Zen-Buddhismus 
(Rzepkowski 1971). The term “Anthropologie” in Rzepkowski’s publication means in effect 
“doctrine of man,” a sub-section of Catholic dogmatic theology. For a more recent, and yet 
not exhaustive bibliography, see Kirita 2005. 
6 A typical expression of this trend, with many valuable perceptions, may be found in 
King 1999.
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to this well-founded theory, Japanese intellectuals and cultural figures 
construct their own invention of “the West.”7 The same is true for other 
countries and cultures. Thus there is also a Muslim image of “the West,” 
which is partly appropriate and partly inappropriate. The process of 
deconstructing these constructions which have been produced in Asian 
cultures has apparently scarcely begun. 
Even more recent is the recognition, admittedly by a very small 
number of people, that both orientalism and occidentalism are based on a 
fundamental misconception which may be termed “Westernism.” This refers 
to the widespread but mistaken idea that somehow modern thought and 
modern interactions are all the result of “Western” proposals or challenges, 
against which reactions occurred and occur. This assumption is shared by 
orientalists and occidentalists alike. Of course there is some truth in it—but 
it is not the whole truth. When it is argued, as by some, that even “rational 
thinking” is a Western “project” for which we are all somehow dependent 
on the ancient Greeks, then things have gone too far. For one thing, we 
have to remember that there is a serious tradition of Indian logic, which 
was of course important in the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, even if 
it somehow makes use of logic to “go beyond” logic. Moreover, we should 
also remember that there was a considerable tradition of systematic and 
critical debate in the intellectual tradition of Japan itself, notably in the Edo 
Period, during which a sustained critique of Buddhist tradition was mounted 
by Tominaga Nakamoto 富永仲基 (1715–1746). In the past I have been told 
that the ideas of Tominaga could not possibly have been developed by 
himself, because they are comparable to Western ideas! Therefore people 
often assume that there “must have been” Western influence on him. Such 
assumptions are not only impolite, they are also quite inaccurate.8
Now it must be admitted that it is one of the features of Suzuki’s writings 
that he frequently seems to have presupposed a clear contrast between 
“Eastern” and “Western” ways of thinking. In particular he regarded an 
insistence on logic, as taught in Western philosophy, as an obstacle to the 
understanding of Buddhism, as may be documented in many of his writings. 
According to his understanding of Zen, illogicalities are not only frequent 
7 See Pye 2003 and also Pye 2000.
8 See the introduction to my English translations of Tominaga’s works (Tominaga 1990). 
This includes a section showing that there can have been no Western influence on his 
thought. Normally it is not necessary to argue, historically, that something is not the case, 
but the strength of the expectation to the contrary was evidently so strong that the question 
had to be addressed.
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but also helpful in leading the monk or layman, in training, to a new view of 
things. This is indeed characteristic of the Zen Buddhist tradition, especially 
in its Rinzai 臨済 form. Western readers attracted by Suzuki’s works on Zen 
Buddhism seem to have found this approach particularly attractive. But 
could they “understand” it? I believe that some of them could. If so, then 
some Westerners appear not to have suffered unduly from a “Western” way 
of thinking. Paradoxically therefore, Suzuki held an image, or a caricature, 
of “Western” thinking which was not entirely appropriate. According to 
that image, Westerners would not be able to understand what he was try-
ing to explain. On the other hand there will have been those Westerners 
who helped him to create this image, either by insisting on “logic” in 
inappropriate situations, or by reinforcing the call for an “exoticist” image 
of an “East” which was supposed to be “different.” In other words, they 
demanded an “illogical” East, which Suzuki then provided. This “East” was 
of course superior to the merely “logical” West.
Also rather recent in the international discussion is the recognition that 
a considerable amount of publishing and other cultural activity such as 
art, and even sport, serves to promote cultural hegemony. This has been 
researched extensively in a recent Ph.D. dissertation by Elisabetta Porcu 
entitled “Pure Land Buddhism and Cultural Hegemony in Modern and 
Contemporary Japan” (University of Marburg, 2006).9 Suzuki was caught 
up in this discourse, and it seems that he narrowly escaped becoming a 
serious nationalist. As we have seen, some of his writings were published 
with approval at the height of the Nazi period in Germany. On the other 
hand, his main international orientation was towards America. As is well 
known, his wife Beatrice Erskine Lane (1825–1939) was an American, and 
she had a long-term influence on his work and personal view of the world. 
At the same time, neither of them were politically progressive or, as far as 
we know, even tentatively critical of current political attitudes. Perhaps this 
slight bending with the wind occurred because they were both so conscious 
of the complexities of cultural interactions and were interested above all in 
their own function as communicators. Communicators are always caught 
between languages and concepts, struggling to look both this way and 
that, and so it undoubtedly was in the case of Suzuki. It somehow seems 
appropriate that the cover of a recent republication of his book Buddha of 
Infinite Light depicts Amida Buddha looking back, or rather to one side 
and back, being an illustration of the famous statue at the Eikandō 永観堂 
9 This was recently published as Porcu 2008. 
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of Zenrinji 禅林寺 in Kyoto, that is, the Migaeri Amida.10 The exercise of 
compassion requires flexibility, it may be said.
Suzuki Daisetsu and the “Essence” of Buddhism
Suzuki’s view of Buddhism can fairly be described as arising on the basis 
of an “essentialist” approach to the interpretation of religious traditions. 
This means that he assumed that it is possible, or at least desirable, to some-
how sum up or characterize the main point of a religious tradition. This 
was a widespread assumption in the twentieth century. Edward Conze, for 
example, a well-known specialist in the study of early Mahayana Buddhism, 
wrote a book entitled Buddhism: Its Essence and Development (1951).11 
Suzuki himself presented a lecture entitled Bukkyō no taii 仏教の大意, the 
English version of which was entitled The Essence of Buddhism (1948). 
This lecture was held in the presence of Emperor Shōwa 昭和 (Hirohito 裕
仁) shortly after the end of the war. The question may arise whether taii has 
exactly the same meaning as “essence,” but the general comparability is not 
in doubt. This term is not all modern, occurring also in the Liuzu tan jing 
六祖壇経 to refer to that which is passed on from master to master, or from 
mind to mind.12 In Bukkyō no taii, Suzuki gives a summary view of some 
of the leading ideas of Buddhism: compassion, wisdom, the bodhisattva, 
and so on. In other words, he seeks to present in a small space the essential 
features of Buddhism, or what it is which should above all be transmitted, 
or communicated.
In many quarters today this approach is criticized as being unhistorical 
and unsophisticated. People speak of the problem of “essentialism,” that 
10 The new edition was edited by Taitetsu Unno (a Shin Buddhist) in 1998. The book was 
first published in 1970 under the title of Shin Buddhism on the basis of talks held in 1958 
before the American Buddhist Academy in New York City, when Suzuki was in his late 
eighties. It has since been translated into other languages.
11 This influential book was also published in French as Le Bouddhisme dans son essence 
et son développement (1952) and in German as Der Buddhismus: Wesen und Entwicklung 
(1953). We may note that it was also translated later into Japanese under the title Bukkyō: 
Sono kyōri to tenkai 仏教：その教理と展開 (1975), but this title offers no term for “essence” 
(e.g., honshitsu 本質), translating it instead as kyōri, meaning doctrine, teachings or dog-
matics. This decision displays not only a lack of understanding of the importance of the 
notion that Buddhism has some kind of “essence” in the Western reception of Buddhism at 
the time when Conze was writing, but also fails to recognize that this very concept continues 
to be problematic. It cannot just be swept under the carpet.
12 See Yampolsky 1967.
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is, the problem about those who (as it is said) wrongly assume that it is 
possible to identify the “essence” of a religious tradition. However, there 
is often a certain amount of confusion about this. If we are historians, 
or specialists in the study of religions, we should of course avoid “es-
sentialism.” It is not our task to claim that we can authoritatively say 
what the fundamental or essential meaning of some particular religious 
faith or orientation is, as if we had the right to invent it or construct it for 
ourselves. However, this does not mean that religious people, believers, 
preachers, expositors and so on, themselves avoid this question. They do 
not. Indeed they may be most concerned to indicate the “real” meaning of 
their religious tradition, its quintessence, its main point, the ghee of the 
ghee (daigo 醍醐). In fact it may be said that it is one of their normal tasks. 
For example, in the context of Shin Buddhism we may often hear that 
everything really comes down to the attitude of shinjin 信心 . Naturally, this 
important concept is locked up in its own language, and is therefore often 
left untranslated elsewhere. It is very special, very essential. Or one might 
say that the main point of Buddhist experience can be summed up in words 
such as sonomama そのまま or yama kore yama mizu kore mizu 山是山水
是水 or mushin 無心, to use some phrases found in Suzuki’s calligraphy.13 
In such an understanding of tradition, and one’s relationship to it, regular 
processes are involved, as I tried to explain in an essay entitled “Comparative 
Hermeneutics in Religion.”14 In that essay, Suzuki was cited as one of the 
most interesting examples. On the one hand his work is very wide-ranging. 
But then again it is selective from within the Buddhist tradition, in a very 
original way. His particular approach, and selection, are not dependent on 
a denominational position (shūmon 宗門), as is often the case. Moreover he 
seeks to bring it into communication as “Buddhism.” Thus, it is particularly 
interesting that he used the term taii in the title of the lecture mentioned 
above. 
Another example of a famous exponent’s version of the “essence” of 
Buddhism would be the lines which Nāgārjuna respectfully addresses to the 
Buddha before providing his own famous exposition of emptiness:
 No arising and no ceasing
 No permanence and no annihilation
 No identity and no difference
13 See Ōtani Daigaku Hakubutsu Kan 2006, exhibit nos. 96, 93, 89 respectively. 
14 Pye 1973.
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 No arriving and no departing
 Before him who can expound causality
 And fully destroy all vain theories
 I bow my head, before the Enlightened one
 The greatest exponent of them all.15
In these eight verses, Nāgārjuna appears to present the teaching of condi-
tioned arising, pratītyasamutpāda, as the central point of Buddhism. Indeed 
he is not the only one to have seen pratītyasamutpāda as the central point 
of Buddhism, whether as a teaching or as a matter to be apprehended. 
Nevertheless there is a problem about such “essences,” because they can be 
and often are contested. Thus, neutral scholars prefer to leave such matters 
to the proponents of religions and regard all this respectfully from the 
sidelines.16
It should be noted that this may not always be completely possible. 
Sometimes we are obliged to try to assess whether a particular movement is 
a “Buddhist” movement or not. Or we may have to try to assess whether a 
particular exponent of “Buddhism” is giving a broadly acceptable account 
of it, or rather, an individualistic or even an eccentric one. Therefore even 
if we are only historians of religion and not exponents of a faith position, 
we do have to have some idea, preferably a responsible one, about what we 
consider to count as “Buddhism”!17
In any case, in spite of the problem about “essentialism,” it is extremely 
interesting to see what “Buddhism” Suzuki was seeking to transmit. Of 
course everybody thinks at once of his presentations of Zen Buddhism, 
whether in substantial books such as Essays in Zen Buddhism, or in shorter 
works for busy people such as Introduction to Zen Buddhism. However, 
15 Zhonglun 中論 T 30: 1c8–11 (no. 1564). Naturally the translations of such prominent 
lines owe something to one another. On the other hand, liberties are often taken with the text. 
Th. Stcherbatsky, for example, gratuitously inserted the words “relativity” and “nirvana” to 
serve his overall presentation (Stcherbatsky 1977, p.77). In this attempt, care has been taken 
to keep the lines in the right order, so that they end with the praise of the Buddha as in the 
Chinese text. 
16 See, for instance, Tominaga’s “I am not a follower of Confucianism, nor of Daoism, 
nor of Buddhism. I watch their words and deeds from the side and then privately debate 
them” (Tominaga 1990, p 168).
17 Consider the case of Aum Shinrikyō オウム真理教, which claimed Buddhist 
credentials, but most implausibly. Other relatively new religious groups, by contrast, have 
quite a reasonable claim to be regarded as Buddhist, e.g., the Risshō Kōseikai 立正佼成会 in 
Japan, or Won 圓 Buddhism in Korea.
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Suzuki also carried out studies on Sanskrit texts, this too with a view to 
the presentation of his results in English for the wider world. It must have 
been a very exciting time of life for him! When I was a young lecturer in 
England, in the late sixties, the materials on Buddhist studies available for 
students were still very limited. At that time I was most grateful for the 
existence of Suzuki’s translations of the Dacheng qixin lun 大乗起信論 and of 
the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, for his substantial book Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra 
Sūtra and his introductory work Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism.
It is important to remember that Suzuki did not formally represent any 
particular institution. His overall view of Buddhism was therefore not 
doctrinally located. The major schools of Buddhism in Japan usually have 
a rather specific understanding of their teaching or their practice, and it 
is quite clear that Suzuki’s position was not “authoritative” in this sense. 
When publishers refer to his view of Buddhism as “authoritative,” this 
should not be understood in a narrow sense. In fact, Suzuki developed a 
modern version of “Buddhism” which had not previously existed as such, a 
pattern of teachings and communications with which he tried to be true to 
the story of Buddhism in general and of Mahayana Buddhism in particular, 
but in a new time and under new circumstances. 
Suzuki’s view of “Buddhism” may therefore be described as non-de-
nominational (hishūha teki 非宗派的). However, we should consider it not 
by means of this negative concept alone, but also in positive terms. While 
of course he taught much about Zen Buddhism, and not a little about 
Shin Buddhism, what he was mainly trying to do was to communicate the 
leading ideas or the basic spirit of Mahayana Buddhism, the Buddhism of 
the “Great Vehicle.” To give an example, without deference to any school, 
we find in the Essays in Zen Buddhism a lengthy translation and exposition 
of the Gaṇḍavyūha from the Avataṃsaka sūtra, which is particularly 
important in the Huayan 華厳 (Skt. avataṃsaka) school of Buddhism, but at 
the same time can be drawn into association with Zen Buddhism. It can be 
seen from studies of sutras such as this in the early issues of The Eastern 
Buddhist that he regarded them as important in the general historical de-
velopment of Buddhism in China and beyond. 
In view of the plurality of the Buddhist world, it might be said that there 
is in any case no single view of “Buddhism” which can be regarded as 
“authoritative.” However, when Suzuki began his work few attempts had 
been made to present Buddhism as a representation of the whole Buddhist 
world, or as one might say “ecumenically.” It is paradoxical that views of 
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Buddhism which may now challenge a more traditional denominational or 
confessional version of it are themselves the result of the labours of Suzuki 
and others. Note that this is also something which was wanted by Westerners. 
Just as some Japanese converts to Christianity in the nineteenth century 
wanted a faith without denominations or churches, and (under the leadership 
of Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 [1861–1930]) invented the Mukyōkai 無教会 
(Non-Church), so Suzuki invented a pattern of Buddhism which had not 
previously existed as such. This is because his Western readers needed it, 
or at least wanted it. He was very sensitively oriented towards his potential 
readers and therefore took their expectations into account. He also took 
their expected misunderstandings (based on his experience) into account. 
His “Buddhism,” therefore, was influenced by what he thought was needed 
for his communication of “Buddhism.” We will return to this underlying 
theme later. 
Mysticism and Difference
At this point, I would like briefly to discuss Suzuki’s contribution on 
“mysticism.” The “essentialist” assumption often leads to problems, and just 
such a problem appears in the very well-known work Mysticism: Christian 
and Buddhist (1957). Much of this collection is devoted to a study of Meister 
Eckhart, a theme which, as we know, was later profoundly pursued by Ueda 
Shizuteru. Suzuki’s argument in this collection of related essays was, first, 
that Zen and Shin are intimately related, at that level where discriminatory 
thought ends, thus overcoming the polarization of jiriki 自力 and tariki 他力. 
Second, such an overcoming of opposites may also be found in the mystical 
writings of Meister Eckhart. In this respect, Suzuki argued, the experience of 
Zen or Shin can be regarded as very similar to that of Christian mysticism, 
in so far as the latter also is not dependent on conceptual differentiation. 
Putting it briefly, this means that the closer one is to God, or “God,” the 
more radically does the concept of God itself come to be deconstructed.
In my own words, this is expressed in a few lines from a longer poem 
about other things:
 God was there
 slipping about unnoticed
 turning back between the leaves
 (till winter me bereaves)
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 to brush away some old theology
 selectively
and patiently
So God deconstructs himself—or herself. Or at any rate, he or she decon-
structs our “theology,” if we have any, or brushes it away, quite patiently.
When I first read Suzuki’s book on mysticism shortly after it appeared, 
in Japan in 1962,18 I found it most fascinating, and indeed mostly very con-
vincing. It is striking that so much material is drawn here from the tradition of 
Shin Buddhism, in particular from the letters of Rennyo 蓮如 (1415–1499) 
and the notebooks of Asahara Saichi 浅原才市 (1850–1932). This was most 
instructive, especially as I was also studying the Tannishō 歎異抄 at the same 
time. However, I came across one problem in Suzuki’s book. The main 
argu ment is that the mystical traditions of Buddhism and Christianity come 
very close to each other—so close that the publisher of the German edition 
declares on the cover, rather enthusiastically, that the differences between 
Zen/Shin and the teachings of Christianity are “artificial” (künstlich). In-
deed Suzuki teaches us here how close they can be. However, there is 
one chapter which contradicts this view completely, namely the chapter 
which contrasts crucifixion and enlightenment. Here, Suzuki explores the 
significance of the two contrasting physical positions of Jesus on the cross 
(vertical) and the Buddha, whether in the position of seated meditation or of 
nirvana (horizontal). He sees a profound gulf between them. Unfortunately, 
he concludes that the meaning of the verticality of the cross lies in being 
argumentative and assertive, whereas for most interpreters it would be 
precisely the opposite. Jesus was on the cross not because he “asserted” 
(himself or anything else), as some of his disciples apparently had expected, 
but because he accepted or “suffered” the self-assertion of others. The medi-
eval hymn Ave verum corpus refers to this as vere passum, “truly suffered,” 
and we can see here the verbal root from which the grammatical term 
“passive” comes. Jesus was not the agent of his own crucifixion!19
As to the term “mysticism,” it may be added that in recent years the 
study of “mysticism” has made much progress. In particular, philosophers 
of religion (Stace, Smart, Katz and others) have patiently clarified the 
relationship between mystical experience and language. At the same time, 
less attention has been paid to the character of “mysticism” in comparative 
18 I read the German version: Der westliche Weg und der östliche Weg (1960).
19 There have been a few attempts to argue that he was, but these are marginal in the 
history of New Testament research.
13
P Y E :  S U Z U K I  D A I S E T S U ’ S  V I E W  O F  B U D D H I S M
(and hence typologically abstract) terms. There is a particular problem in 
this respect when it comes to discussing this theme in Japanese, because 
the term shinpi 神秘, though given in most dictionaries, electronic or other, 
does not really correspond to “mysticism” at all. It means “mysterious” or 
even “mystificatory.” The religion of Shinran therefore certainly cannot 
be described in Japanese as shinpi teki, but on the other hand this founder 
of Shin Buddhism can be characterized in a precise sense as “a mystical 
religious thinker” in English.20 This definition would be broadly in line 
with Suzuki’s use of the term “mysticism.”
The Three Bodies of the Buddha
Suzuki’s choice of Western or Christian theological terms was sometimes 
appropriate and sometimes less so. As indicated above, it seems to me 
that, for his time, his use of the term “mysticism” was quite reasonable. 
I would like to record however that his use of the term “Trinity” was not 
very helpful. Indeed it caused considerable confusion in Western studies 
of Mahayana Buddhism. The problem was set up through his treatment of 
the theme of the three bodies (trikāya) of the Buddha in his very influential 
work Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (1907), mentioned above. Chapter 
10 of this book bears the title  “The Doctrine of Trikaya” and, in brackets 
beneath, the confusing sub-title “(Buddhist Theory of Trinity).” About this 
he wrote: 
“How did the Buddhists come to relegate the human Buddha to 
oblivion, as it were, and assign a mysterious being in his place 
invested with all possible or sometimes impossible majesty and 
supernaturalism?” This question, which marks the rise of Mahâyâna 
Buddhism, brings us to the doctrine of Trikâya,—which in a sense 
corresponds to the Christian theory of trinity.21
This statement is misleading for two reasons. First, it gives the impression 
that the “doctrine of Trikâya” is a more or less central teaching without 
which Mahayana Buddhism can hardly be explained. However, this is not 
20 As argued in my article (Pye 2004). This is the German version of a hitherto 
unpublished paper entitled “Shinran as a mystical religious thinker,” a lecture for the tenth 
conference of the International Association for Shin Buddhist Studies at Otani University, 
Kyoto (2001) under the title “Shinran’s Place in World Thought.”
21 Suzuki 1963, p. 245.
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so. The leading themes in early Mahayana Buddhism are the concepts: 
bodhisattva, insight (or “wisdom”), compassion, skilful means and 
emptiness. Second, it implies that the concept of trikāya was available at 
the time when Mahayana originated, which is not the case. It seems that for 
Suzuki these two points were connected and that the concept of trikāya was 
both fundamental and present at the beginning.
Admittedly, it would be open to anybody to argue that an “essential” 
feature of a system might only come to be satisfactorily formulated some 
time after its “rise.” Indeed, had Suzuki taken the comparison with the 
Christian teaching of the Trinity seriously he might have adopted this 
point of view, for this doctrine, in fact, took three or four centuries to be 
worked up into its classical form, subsequent to which it has widely been 
regarded as being an essential feature of Christianity. However, he regarded 
the Buddhist parallel (in so far as it is a parallel) as marking “the rise of 
Mahayana Buddhism,” and other accounts have tended to follow his lead in 
this regard. Sukumar Dutt, for example, a respected Indian scholar, could 
write as late as 1966, referring to early Cambodian kings: “They subscribe 
to the Trikāya doctrine, i.e., the concept of the Buddha functioning in three 
kinds of bodies, which is the fundamental doctrine of Mahāyānism.”22 
This combination of a historical confusion with a doctrinal confusion 
was probably caused by the false ascription of the Dacheng qixin lun to the 
Indian writer Aśvaghoṣa. He is supposed to have lived in the century pre-
ceding the Christian era, and due to this erroneous ascription was thought 
to have contributed to the original emergence of Mahayana Buddhism. This 
Chinese text however never in fact existed in Sanskrit, but dates from the 
sixth century CE. The section on the “three bodies” found there is quite 
interesting, but for other reasons.
Quite apart from the major chronological error which arose in connection 
with the Dacheng qixin lun, it should also be noticed that the trikāya 
teaching, though interesting, is not at all fundamental to Mahayana 
Buddhism. It is not even central in the special sense of being a feature which 
was gradually developed and became “essential” later. On the contrary, 
the interest which has been attached to it, because of its supposedly being 
“trinitarian,” has come to obscure a truly fundamental dialectic which runs 
through most Mahayana teachings on the nature and appearances of the 
Buddha or Buddhas.
To some extent, the picture was corrected by Louis de La Vallée Poussin 
22 Dutt 1966, p. 93.
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in an excursus entitled “Notes sur les corps du Bouddha,”23 and also in the 
Buddhist encyclopedia Hôbôgirin under the heading “Busshin” (Buddha-
body).24 In their details these two contributions are splendid. Nevertheless 
the historical perspective remains obscure, which is probably due to the 
continuing influence of earlier misunderstandings. There is much too much 
emphasis on the clarification of ontological questions. Such questions 
play an important role in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, but are 
insignificant (at least in this form) in Buddhism. Much more important for 
the teaching about the trikāya are the functions of the different kinds of 
Buddhas. As a result of this misperception, the significance of the existence 
of both dual and triple formulations has been barely recognized.
It would take too long to discuss the whole development of the trikāya 
concept or doctrine here, but there is an important aspect to bear in mind. If 
we trace it out historically, what we find is that in pre-Mahayana and early 
Mahayana Buddhism there is in fact a binary concept. Only later came 
the triple concept. Although hardly any chronological questions about the 
development of early Mahayana Buddhism can be solved with precision, 
there is now much greater clarity about the broad outlines. This is quite 
sufficient for correcting the general framework for discussion about the 
concept of the trikāya. A three-body doctrine as such appears to have been 
first stated in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, a work ascribed to the earliest 
nameable exponent of the Yogācāra School, namely Maitreyanātha, who is 
reckoned to have flourished around 300 CE. It is therefore not surprising 
that it also occurs in the Dacheng qixin lun, because this work seeks to 
correlate the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika understandings of Buddhism in 
a brief, systematic presentation. 
It is significant that the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, proclaiming itself by 
its title to be “The Ornament of the Sutras of the Great Vehicle,” is sig-
nificantly later than the early Mahayana sutras themselves, in particular the 
Prajñāpāramitā sutras and the Lotus Sutra. These are now generally agreed 
to have been compiled (gradually) at a time slightly before and after the 
beginning of the Christian era. None of them contain the trikāya teaching. 
The “ornament of the sutras” (sūtrālaṃkāra) also postdates the work of 
Nāgārjuna, who produced his systematic exposition of the Mahayana way of 
thinking in the second century CE, but did not propose the trikāya teaching. 
23 See La Vallée Poussin 1929 (esp. pp. 762–813). See also Masson-Oursel 1913.
24 Hôbôgirin, ed. Paul Demiéville et al. 8 vols. to date. Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise, 
1929–.
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The Laṅkāvatāra sūtra poses more difficulties. It is usually regarded as 
a sutra from the second, though still relatively early phase of Mahayana 
Buddhism.25 The relevant passages, being in the main body of the work, 
may be presumed to have antedated the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. It is a 
further irony in the history of images of Buddhism that the Laṅkāvatāra 
sūtra, which Suzuki studied intensively and translated into English, also 
has a concept of three kinds of Buddha. In fact it is possibly the earliest text 
which refers to the different kinds of Buddhas as threefold. However they 
are not referred to as -kāya.
Clearly later is Dacheng qixin lun. As a summary of Mahayana ideas, this 
is loyal to both the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra Schools, presupposing 
their existence. It was already pointed out that it cannot be dated before 
the middle of the sixth century CE. The treatment of the idea of the trikāya 
is similar to that of the earlier Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, but the interesting 
point is that all of the three types of body are correlated with the concept 
of suchness (Ch. zhenru 真如). Thus the underlying dialectic is binary. On 
the one hand there is a certain kind of “body,” and then again each “body” 
has the character of suchness. In other words, although reference is made to 
three kinds of “Buddha-body,” these are all understood in two aspects, the 
aspect of their appearance and that of their suchness.
Chronologically proximate is a highly interesting chapter of the Hebu jin 
guang ming jing 合部金光明経 (The Compiled Version of the Sutra of Brilliant 
Golden Light), which was completed in 597 CE.26 The title of Chapter 3 of 
this sutra can be easily and precisely translated as “Distinguishing the three 
bodies” (Fenbie sanshen pin 分別三身品). Unfortunately, the well-known 
translator of this sutra into German, Johannes Nobel, slipped towards the 
wrong view noted above by rendering it “the teaching of the three bodies” 
(die Lehre von den drei Körpern),27 as if it were a fixed doctrine depending 
25 To judge from its miscellaneous structure, which indicates that it is a collection, it 
must have been compiled over some time. However, a terminus ad quem is provided by the 
earliest extant Chinese version produced in 443 CE by Guṇabhadra (T no. 670).
26 This version of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa sūtra was compiled using three earlier Chinese 
translations by Dharmakṣema (385–433), Paramārtha (499–569) and Yaśogupta (ca. 
sixth century). Although the translations by Paramārtha and Yaśogupta have been lost, 
Dharmakṣema’s can be found at T no. 663 and compared with the compiled version referred 
to above (T no. 664). The chapter in question does not appear in the extant Sanskrit text nor 
in Dharmakṣema’s translation. However, a Sanskrit version probably did in fact exist. 
27 Nobel 1958, ad loc. His translation relies on the translation by Yijing 義浄 (635–713) 
of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa sūtra, which is dated at 704 CE.
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on the number three. However, in the text we read that on the one hand the 
dharmakāya is without characteristics, while the other two kinds of body 
are with characteristics. So a Buddha-body is either with characteristics 
or without characteristics. In spite of the reference to “three bodies,” it is 
this binary dialectic, a movement of thought from the kind of “body” with 
characteristics to the kind without them, which counts more than the mere 
differentiation of characteristics.
Of course there are many more texts which might be taken into account. 
The main point however is that in the early Mahayana we find a twofold 
or binary view of the Buddha. That is, we can discern on the one hand 
a manifestation of Buddhahood in human form, and on the other hand 
there appears to be a transcendental being such as is found in Chapter 
15 (or in Chinese usually Chapter 16) of the Lotus Sutra.28 The relations 
between these two forms are dialectical in the sense that the more easily 
recognizable human form is there for humans to perceive, in other words 
as an upāya, while the transcendental form is that which indicates the 
dissolution of this upāya into the goal of the teaching, namely supreme 
enlightenment or nirvana without residue. The human form (rūpakāya) acts 
out the apparent process of enlightenment and nirvana. On the other hand, 
the Tathāgata whose life is of unlimited duration suggests the potential 
transformation of ordinary ways of thinking into a consciousness which 
no longer differentiates, or to use one of Suzuki’s favorite expressions, 
“discriminates,” between the way and the goal. The interesting thing is 
that when we look at the various statements of the three-body “doctrine” 
carefully, we see that this binary dialectic is always maintained. Whatever 
glorious manifestations there may be, the dharmakāya remains as an 
“absolute” reference point which enables differentiated manifestations to be 
dissolved, or resolved at the conclusion of the salvific process.
So it seems as if Suzuki caused considerable confusion here by talking 
about the “Trinity.” The question is, why did he do it? The chronological 
misplacement of the Dacheng qixin lun is one thing. It is easy to say this 
many years later.29 However, the main problem was that Suzuki was very 
sensitive, even too sensitive, to the expectations of Western readers. By 
drawing a parallel between the trikāya and the Trinity (and of course the 
28 The binary form also becomes apparent in the treatment of the concept of ātmabhāva 
in the Lotus Sutra (Matsunaga 1969).
29 For English readers, the position is set out in the translation and study by Hakeda 
Yoshihito (Hakeda 1967).
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element tri- is very tempting), he assisted Western readers in understanding 
it somehow. But, in turn, this led to the problem that the dharmakāya, or the 
Buddha of unlimited life-duration, was then absolutized ontologically, so 
that it seemed as if some kind of transcendental theism had been developed, 
with many other spiritual beings besides. This then came to be regarded as 
a significant change from, or even a betrayal of early Buddhism. I do not 
believe that this understanding of the development of Mahayana Buddhism 
is justified. But the Western readers of those times seem to have wanted it 
that way. Their wish led Suzuki into his mode of presentation. At the same 
time, a careful reading of his works shows that he did not himself share 
such an ontologized view of suchness (though it is not altogether unknown 
in Japanese Buddhism). Rather, he regarded all such concepts as mere 
pointers to an ineffable experience which does not depend on assertions of 
any kind.
Why Did the First Patriarch Come from the West?
One of the famous Zen Buddhist questions which Suzuki commented 
on, when teasing and instructing his Western readers, runs: “Why did 
Bodhidharma come from the West?” This may be found in an article 
published in his extremely influential work Essays in Zen Buddhism 
(Second Series, 1933). It is typical of Suzuki’s easy-going approach that he 
simply changed the original question, for Western readers, by adding the 
name! The original runs “Why did the patriarch come from the West?”30 
The strange thing is that, in an American perspective, Suzuki himself came 
from the West, rather from the East. At the same time it may be said that his 
work reached Europe both from the West and the East.
The basic difficulty in interpreting Suzuki’s writings, as a whole corpus, 
is that he sometimes wants to find similarities with Western thought, 
especially but not only religious thought, while at the same time he not 
infrequently wants to assert a profound difference. This is the fundamental 
problem about orientalism and occidentalism, which the expressions “East” 
and “West” inevitably suggest. There is a lot to think about here. We all 
love “difference.” Vive la différence! If there is no “difference,” culturally 
and religiously speaking, then there is no need to transmit anything. But if 
there is a profound difference, as Suzuki sometimes suggests, then it may 
30 I commented on this in a lecture for the Japanese Culture Institute in Cologne, 
published as Pye 1990.
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not be possible to transmit anything. The question therefore arises: “Can 
Westerners understand Buddhism?” One answer is “no.” But in spite of all 
the people met by Suzuki who evidently had difficulties with understanding 
Buddhism, the answer “no” is not a very good one. A better answer is 
“yes.” This answer can be justified by the counter-question: “Can Chinese 
understand Buddhism?” Whatever we may think about the character of 
Chinese Buddhism, it is hard to give the answer “no” in this case. After all, 
if the task of transmission was by definition impossible, the famous question 
“Why did the patriarch come from the West?” takes on a particularly hollow 
tone. In fact, the transmission of Buddhism from India to China may be 
regarded as one of the great cultural feats of all time. According to R. H. 
Robinson, “the Chinese” even understood Mādhyamika Buddhism, even 
though this was very difficult.31 The Mādhyamika account of Buddhist 
teaching was originally formulated in an Indo-European language, using a 
strictly formulated logic previously unknown in China and not used very 
much in East Asia even afterwards! Moreover, if “the Chinese” failed to 
understand “Buddhism,” how could “the Japanese” understand it? Well, of 
course, many Japanese do not understand Buddhism. But there have been 
many great teachers of the Buddhist Dharma in Japan, and in spite of their 
differences this simple observer has concluded that most of them have 
understood “it.” So the answer “yes” is better than the answer “no.” This 
must also apply to “Westerners.”
Of course, if we follow Suzuki (or if he himself had followed his own line 
of thought more consistently), we might not be satisfied with a distinction 
between “yes” and “no.” After all, these are easily misunderstood words, 
especially in Japanese. But rather than worrying about such superficialities, 
we should ask why this question arises at all. It probably arises because 
people entertain the “essentialist” fallacy. That is, the question “Can 
Westerners understand Buddhism?” presupposes that there “are” Westerners 
and that there “is” something such as “Buddhism.” Of course, we should 
use these terms, sometimes, but we should not allow them to trap us in the 
“essentialist” fallacy.
As far as we know, Suzuki himself did not reflect on these matters very 
much at a meta-level, because he was after all very busy indeed with the 
process of transmission itself. By now we have had the advantage of a few 
more decades to think about it. What is the conclusion? Or, as we should 
better say, how may we regard this matter now? It is true to say that the 
31 Robinson 1967.
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elucidatory process is open, and critically informed, in a way which was 
not conceivable fifty years ago. Moreover, the process of the diachronic 
transmission of “Buddhism” has become very complex, culturally. In par-
ticular, many share in it who do not maintain a denominational affiliation. 
Whatever may be felt about the needs of religious organizations, thinking 
people can be quite happy about this. On the other hand, we should not 
think too much! The “simplicities” are important and if we think too much 
we may fail to understand them. An aspect of Suzuki’s skill was that he 
could often bring things down to a simple point which broke through the 
complexities. That is the meaning of his coming both from the East and 
from the West. 
 
Non-discrimination as an “Eastern,” Buddhist Virtue
I think we can now understand much better how Suzuki’s view of Buddhism 
was constructed, why he translated and interpreted the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, 
why he wrote Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, and why he translated 
Dacheng qixin lun. In so far as non-discrimination (funi 不二) was the 
message, then the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra was a perfect text. He also used a few 
of the shorter Prajñāparāmitā sutras for this purpose. He could have used 
Vimalakīrtinirdeśa sūtra, but this was being contemporaneously translated 
in The Eastern Buddhist by another writer, being another work which was 
published in German at the height of the Nazi period. Suzuki’s presentations 
of Zen Buddhism spoke to an audience who was prepared to listen to an 
“authoritative” voice which declared that “Western” ways of thought, with 
which they were disenchanted, could be overcome by deconstruction. The 
presentation of Shin Buddhism was insightful and sincere, but showed 
this Buddhism of faith in a similar light, that is, as based on a subjective 
experience which did not presuppose a systematic or logically built-up 
doctrinal structure. Typically, he emphasizes the konomama of Asahara 
Saichi, just as he is at pains to explain the notion of “suchness” (tathatā) in 
his writings on Zen. It is however striking that he took up Shinran’s complex 
Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証 as his last major task of translation. What was his 
motivation here? Institutionally it reflects the fact that he not only had a life-
long loyalty to the Rinzai Zen tradition of Engakuji 円覚寺 in Kamakura, 
but also a later loyalty to the Shinshū-oriented Otani University, where the 
offices of The Eastern Buddhist were (and still are) located. But I think there 
is more. While enjoying the spontaneity and the intellectual elasticity of Zen 
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Buddhism, to which he found a certain counterpart in the non-intellectual, 
more or less mystical notion of konomama in Shin Buddhism, he also 
displayed a certain recognition of the systematic nature of Buddhist thought. 
In a sense, this is provided for Shin Buddhism by the Kyōgyōshinshō. 
Systematic teaching is not a feature of Buddhism which Western readers 
necessarily want to know about, as Suzuki realized, but at the same time 
they do want to know what the main point of Buddhism is, or as one said 
in those times, its “essence.” To approach this problem, playful writing was 
not enough. It was necessary to summarize positions in “Buddhism” and 
in particular in “Mahayana Buddhism” which were not based on specific, 
selected sutras. Suzuki rather avoided sutras which provide the main doc-
trinal focus of a particular denomination or sect. There is no work by him on 
the Lotus Sutra, which is central to Tendai 天台 and Nichiren 日蓮 Buddhism, 
the Mahāvairocana-sūtra, which provides a key reference point for Shingon 
真言 Buddhism, or even the three major sutras of Pure Land Buddhism. But 
he did write his Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism and he also translated the 
Dacheng qixin lun which is conceived as a systematic work, if a brief one. 
In a sense the translation of the Kyōgyōshinshō continued this aspect of his 
work although, perhaps unfortunately, it appeared only after he had already 
established his dominant reputation with his works on Zen. As a result, less 
notice of it was taken in the Western world. 
Conclusion
I have four conclusions. But before I come to them I would like to record 
that, apart from having benefited from reading his works, I have the very 
slightest, indirect connection (what in Japanese would be called en 縁 ) 
with Suzuki. This arose when, probably in 1965,32 I had the opportunity 
in Tokyo to check through a foreword which he had written for his friend 
R. H. Blyth, a resident of Japan and another interpreter of Zen who helped 
to shape its modern image. There was little to correct in the foreword, but 
unfortunately my hope of meeting the great man briefly myself was not 
possible because of his very advanced age. Visiting the exhibition at Otani 
University a little while ago, I experienced some nostalgia when seeing not 
only the books which I read in those days, laid out in glass cases, but also 
Suzuki’s typewriter, his suit and his suitcase, suitable for travelling abroad 
32 It may have been 1964 or even 1966, the year of Suzuki’s death.
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by sea. It reminded me of my own first voyage to Japan by sea in 1961, 
with one suitcase, one suit, some books, and my first, remarkably similar 
typewriter, acquired en route in Hong Kong. It is against the background of 
these simple associations, perhaps rather sentimental, that I have presumed 
to make some criticisms of Suzuki’s work above. Somehow I feel that I can 
understand his “project,” as they say nowadays. 
Now to the four conclusions. First, the choices made by Suzuki were 
fundamentally led by what he regarded as necessary for the formulation of 
Buddhism for Western people. In return therefore, it was largely the needs 
of Western people in the twentieth century which determined Suzuki’s 
own view of Buddhism itself. I put this forward as a hypothesis. In this 
short exploration my hypothesis is little more than a hint, based mainly 
on the Western language works. It is in no way intended to disparage the 
importance of his Zen training at Engakuji in Kamakura. Nor do I mean 
to underestimate the influence of his interaction with the Kyoto School, 
which however may sometimes have been overestimated.33 In any case, it 
would be very valuable if future researchers would consider the importance 
of Suzuki’s own view of “the West” more exhaustively, taking into account 
the Japanese works and in particular Suzuki’s correspondence and other 
occasional writings. I expect that the results might lead to a strengthening 
of this hypothesis, and in any event to a better understanding of the precise 
importance of Suzuki’s view of the “West” on his view of “Buddhism.”
Second, Suzuki’s works are a reflection of East-West interaction in the 
twentieth century. They could not have been written, for example, in the 
eighteenth century, and it would not be quite appropriate any more to write 
in this manner in the twenty-first century. Yet, this does not detract from the 
33 What is meant here is that the Kyoto School did not have a particularly strong influence 
on Suzuki’s view of Buddhism (my subject), which seems to have been largely formed 
before he came to be (indirectly) identified with it. Suzuki’s interactions with the Kyoto 
philosophers can be followed up in Dumoulin 1993, and of course they are interesting. It 
should be remembered however that there has been a long engagement between academic 
Catholic missionaries with the Kyoto School, which seeks to establish a common level of 
philosophical discourse and hence a route for the presentation of Catholic philosophical 
theology. This engagement would warrant a critical study in its own right. It is in effect 
a mirror of the interaction of Japanese thinkers in the Nishida tradition with Western 
philosophy, establishing a discourse in which “Zen philosophy” can be communicated 
both to the outside world, and consequently also with more authority within Japan itself. 
Thus, Dumoulin likes to include Suzuki as part of this process, because of his fame, but his 
participation may be a little exaggerated. 
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lasting value of his work. It is the story of one man’s enduring and patient 
encounter with a foreign language and way of thinking, mainly American, 
with which he was concerned through most of his adult life. At the time of 
writing, there is apparently no substantial biography of Suzuki in a Western 
language. Yet, the available materials including letters and diaries (also 
those of his wife) certainly warrant one.34 Through Suzuki’s experiences we 
can enjoy the fascination of an individual’s discovery of a world beyond the 
first world. It is one of the many such stories of modern Japan.
Third, Suzuki’s Zen is drawn from Rinzai Zen, and more or less ignores 
Sōtō 曹洞 Zen. This is partly because of his experience at Engakuji, and 
partly because his perception of the Western world was that an interactive 
discourse, more typical of Rinzai Zen, was expected. Of course, Sōtō Zen 
has also been transmitted to the Western world, but it is more difficult to 
write exciting books about it! While Suzuki’s Zen is drawn mainly from 
Rinzai Zen, and from the substantial Chinese tradition, it is not altogether 
clear whether it clearly represents Japanese Rinzai Zen in general or not. 
Probably it is best to think of it as Suzuki’s Zen.
Fourth, Suzuki’s view of “Buddhism” represents a new model which 
only became possible in modern times. Suzuki is riding a bicycle with two 
wheels: he is presenting “Zen Buddhism,” and he is presenting “Mahayana 
Buddhism.” It would be interesting to consider whether one of these 
wheels is larger than the other and includes it, and if so, which one. The 
answer is not obvious. Because of the historically strong denominational 
(confessional) structure of Japanese Buddhism, it is only in modern times 
that this question has become really visible. This is partly because of the 
substantial interest and progress in the identification of reliable manuscripts, 
in the question of the origins of the Mahayana, and in questions about 
the relations between the various early sutras and schools. In a new way 
therefore, it has become possible to ask “What is the Mahayana?” Moreover, 
quite apart from questions of historical research, Buddhist scholars and 
teachers in Japan have increasingly tended to present their own particular 
traditions in the light of this question, in order to avoid being just an isolated 
relic from the past. As was already pointed out, Suzuki was one of the 
pioneers in developing this concept with his book Outlines of Mahayana 
34 There are innumerable interactions with well-known figures such as Heidegger and 
Tillich to consider, but also, in Japan, with other leading Buddhist scholars such as Soga 
Ryōjin 曽我量深, as explored in the lecture by Ueda Shizuteru. Here, the demarcations between 
one view of Buddhism and another, often very subtle, can be more precisely determined.
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Buddhism (1907), which therefore in its way symbolizes the opening of 
a new period of an integral, inter-confessional Buddhism.35 A tentative 
answer to the question about the two wheels might be that it is Mahayana 
Buddhism which is the larger, within which Zen, for Suzuki, represents a 
smaller, concentrated center. An early recognition of the importance of Shin 
Buddhism was reinforced in the context of his later association with Otani 
University, from where he also had converse with the Kyoto School. Yet 
above all he realized that, as with all the later forms of Buddhism in East 
Asia, the central insights to which recourse is made are to be found in the 
origins. It is for this reason that his study and exposition of early Mahayana 
sutras continued well into the 1930s. In this sense we see in the work of 
Suzuki, in interaction with the Western world, a new point of departure 
for the understanding of Mahayana Buddhism. This approach continues to 
represent a challenge to the contemporary Buddhist world.
ABBREVIATION
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大蔵経. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe 
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